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THE FELONY-MURDER
RULE: IN SEARCH OF A
VIABLE DOCTRINE*
INTRODUCTION
When a homicide has occurred during the perpetration of a felony, the
felony-murder doctrine recognizes the intent to commit the underlying
felony as a substitute for the mens rea normally required to support a
murder conviction.' As a result of widespread recognition of the harshness
* This article is a student work prepared by Jeanne Hall Seibold, a member of the St.
Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
Under the felony-murder doctrine, the mens rea is established by proof of intent to commit
the underlying felony, on a theory of constructive intent. When first applied in England,
"constructive malice" was applied to all killing resulting from the commission of any unlaw-
ful act. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 56 (6th ed. 1680). Foster dictated that the unlawful act must
be a felony. M. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 258 (2d ed. 1791). See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
192-93 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE], in which the author restated the rule:
[W]hen an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be
either murder or manslaughter . . . . If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or
in its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but, if no more
was intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter.
Id.
Murder and manslaughter were punished similarly at early common law, since they were
the same crime (mens rea was not considered an element of the crime). Id. at 224. Both crimes
were subject to the benefit of clergy, which allowed literate persons charged with
crime-originally only members of the clergy-to be tried by ecclesiastical tribunals. This
had the effect of harboring the felon from the gallows, since ecclesiastical courts did not
impose the death sentence. For a discussion of benefit of clergy, see 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 441-57 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK
& MAITLAND].
When first developed, application of the felony-murder doctrine was of little conse-
quence, since the punishment for all felonies was death, and it made little difference whether
the guilty party was hanged for the homicide or for the underlying felony. See Powers v.
Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 416, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901). Benefit of clergy was later denied
to murderers and their accomplices under a series of statutes passed between 1496 and 1547.
12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496); 4 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1512); 23 Hen. 8, c. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, §
10 (1547). See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra at 476; Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice
Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 542-43 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Perkins]. With the elimi-
nation of benefit of clergy for murder, the felony-murder doctrine operated to bring to the
gallows those literate criminals who would otherwise be more leniently punished in the eccle-
siastical courts for the underlying felony and the manslaughter.
In most states, the underlying felony must be one of those enumerated by statute or
considered "inherently dangerous" to human life. See notes 12-37 and accompanying text
infra.
Some states require not only that the death occur during the perpetration of the felony,
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inherent in its application,' the doctrine has been subjected to a variety of
limitations.3 Few states, however, have gone so far as to abolish felony
but also in furtherance of the criminal intent. See note 74 and accompanying text infra. Other
jurisdictions extend "perpetration" to include attempts and/or flight from the scene. See
notes 72-73 and accompanying text infra.
The felony-murder doctrine has been the subject of vitriolic criticism for centuries. Early
critics included Judge James Fitzjames Stephen, who considered the felony-murder doctrine
as stated by Coke "astonishing." Coke would have applied the doctrine to a death occurring
as a result of any unlawful act. See E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 56 (6th ed. 1680). Judge Stephen
found even the Foster version of the rule, which required only that the underlying unlawful
act be a felony, see M. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 258 (2d ed. 1791), to be "cruel and monstrous."
3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57-75 (1883). Judge Stephen has been
credited with shaping the felony-murder rule in England by his instruction to the jury in
Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (Q.B. 1887):
[I]nstead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes
death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be
dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death, done for the purpose of committing
a felony which causes death, should be murder.
Id. at 313, quoted in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 277 (3d ed.
1975). See R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 43 (1952).
In America, the most renowned of the early critics of the felony-murder doctrine was
Justice Holmes, who questioned the deterrent effect of the rule:
[I]f a man does an act with intent to commit a felony, and thereby accidentally kills
another, . . . [tihe fact that the shooting is felonious does not make it any more likely
to kill people. If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it should make
accidental killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to steal;
while, if its object is to prevent stealing, it would do better to hang one thief in every
thousand by lot.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 57-58 (1881).
Criticism of the rule continues unabated. See Hippard, The Unconstitutionality of Crim-
inal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10
Hous. L. REv. 1039, 1945 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hippard]; Moreland, A Re-
Examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971: The Model Penal Code, 59 Ky. L.J. 788, 804
(1971); Note, Felony Murder As a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE
L.J. 427 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Anachronism]. But see Note, A Survey of Felony
Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453 (1955), wherein the author states: "It is submitted that the law
should not be over solicitous toward the violator of public peace and safety, and if a man
through the commission of a crime of violence contributes substantially to the death of
another, there is no injustice in declaring that contribution murder." Id. at 466.
2 The harshness of the rule stems from its imposition of substantial criminal liability for
accidental deaths. See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963). Particularly harsh is the application of the felony-murder
doctrine in cases of vicarious liability of cofelons under conspiracy laws and by extension of
proximate causality. See notes 71-91 and accompanying text infra.
I One commentator suggests that the felony-murder doctrine may be considered unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it obviates the necessity for proof of an element of the crime, drawing
support for this contention from the Supreme Court's ruling that the burden of proof as to
the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" lies with the prosecution. See
Rubin, Homicide, Commentaries on the Maine Criminal Code, 28 ME. L. REv. 57, 62 (1976).
Another commentator writes:
Long-standing judicial approval of the presumption provides strong indication that the
presumption comports with due process. The historical basis, however, is not in itself
sufficient to establish the presumption's constitutionality. As the applicable standard
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murder.' Despite substantial changes in state homicide laws in recent
of constitutional scrutiny changes, the common law as embodied by statute must be
reevaluated in light of the evolving standard.
Comment, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and
the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L.J. 1021, 1035-36 (1975) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Constitutional Limitations]. But see notes 108-19 and accompanying text infra.
I Only Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished the felony-murder rule. See HAW. REv. STAT. §
707-701 (1976) (Felony-murder rule); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1975) (cur-
rent version at Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (Supp. 1977)).
England abolished the rule in 1957. See Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1,
which provides:
(1) Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offense,
the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought
(express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in
the course or furtherance of another offense.
Id.
The fact that the doctrine was rarely invoked in England in the years preceding its
abolition has been explained as a consequence of both the criticism of the doctrine and the
"natural distaste" for a constructive theory of crime. Prevezer, The English Homicide Act:
A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 624, 635 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Prevezer]. In most cases where the doctrine was invoked by the courts without
triggering a reprieve from the Home Secretary, malice could have been implied from an act
intended or likely to kill or cause grievous harm. See id.
The distinction between the concept of constructive malice, which was abolished, and
that of implied malice, which was specifically retained in the new murder statute, was then
not altogether clear, since the terms had been used interchangeably in the past. See T.
MoRIus & L. BLOM-COOPER, A CALENDAR OF MURDER: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN ENGLAND SINCE
1957, 313 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Momus]; J. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 140 (17th ed. 1958). It has been suggested that the term "implied" malice should have
been replaced by. an "inference" of malice where an inference of fact was intended. Perkins,
supra note 1, at 550. It is now clear that malice is "implied," or may be inferred, from an
intention to cause grievous bodily harm or from an act which is or should be known to be
likely to cause such harm. "Constructive" malice is that implied by law where death has
occurred in the course of an unlawful act.
It has been suggested that the elimination of "constructive" malice will have limited
effect, since "the use of fiction in the law of murder has by no means disappeared," MoRRIs,
supra at 318, and since in many cases where the felony-murder doctrine had been applied in
the past, intent could be implied. Id. It is submitted that this is one of the most persuasive
arguments in favor of abolition of the doctrine: it is not necessary to the establishment of
criminal liability in the majority of cases in which it has been applied, and its application to
those cases in which death occurred wholly by accident-i.e., without intent or likelihood of
harm-is contrary to the modern trend toward establishment of culpability as the basis of
criminal liability. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959);
Hippard, supra note 1, at 1040; Anachronism, supra note 1, at 433.
It has been argued that Parliament should have eliminated the concept of implied malice
as well, attaching the stigma of a murder conviction only to intentional killings and availing
itself of the wide range of punishment available under manslaughter as a viable alternative.
MoRRIs, supra at 319.
Other commentators have suggested that what was abolished with one stroke of the pen
was at least partially reinstated with the next, since murder in the course of or in furtherance
of theft, shooting, or explosion was elevated to a capital crime. See Prevezer, supra at 648,
650-51. Capital punishment has since been abolished in England. See Murder (Abolition of
Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71.
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years, 5 the doctrine has survived the attacks of its critics and retained a
significant degree of viability.
The reluctance of jurisdictions to abolish altogether the felony-murder
doctrine apparently can be ascribed more to social and political pressures
than to any flaw in the logic employed by the rule's critics. It is the purpose
of this Note to attempt to determine which of the various limitations
adopted can serve to justify the use of the felony-murder fiction as a
substitute for intent to murder. To this end, the present limitations on
application of the doctrine in the several jurisdictions will be outlined, and
the major criticisms of the doctrine which survive these legislative restric-
tions indicated. There will then follow an evaluation of the relative merits
of the limiting devices, in an effort to suggest the most effective manner
of structuring the rule's application as an alternative to total abolition.
When New York's Penal Law was revised, the felony-murder doctrine was retained. See
Schwartz & Skolnick, Drafting a New Penal Law for New York-An Interview with Richard
Denzer, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 251, 260-61 (1968-1969) [hereinafter cited as Denzer]. While
some members of the Law Revision Commission favored abolition of the felony-murder rule,
the majority "tried to be realistic in terms of what the community was ready to accept." Id.
at 261.
Denzer acknowledges the trend toward establishing culpability as the basis for determin-
ing severity of punishment, but he argues that felony murder "deserves treatment equivalent
to that of murder" with regard to culpability. Id. This view is contrary to that of the drafters
of the Model Penal Code, who recommended the abolition of the felony-murder doctrine
precisely because it conflicted with the Code's basic premise that criminal liability should
be based on mens rea. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1446 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
' After the Supreme Court's capital punishment ruling in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), wherein the Court invalidated death sentences imposed upon three defendants in
instances in which the statutory scheme allowed the jury discretion to impose the death
penalty, states which sought to retain the death penalty were forced to revise their homicide
laws. The alternatives available to retentionist legislatures are discussed in Wollan, The
Death Penalty after Furman, 4 Loy. Cm. L.J. 339 (1973), wherein the author notes:
[A] retentionist alternative, to be constitutional, must be one that promises in its
administration either greater frequency of death sentences or a "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not." . . .
One approach to lessen the infrequency of the death sentence is narrowing the
range of offenses subject to the death penalty, so as to remove from its scope certain
crimes, such as . . . felony murder, in which there are serious difficulties posed by the
unintended quality of the homicide and the vicarious liability of co-felons. This will
have the effect of increasing the frequency and rationality of death sentences for the
remaining capital offenses.
Id. at 344 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
While most revised statutes follow this reasoning and make felony-murder a non-capital
crime, the majority also provide that intentional murder in the course of an inherently
dangerous crime is punishable by death. That is, where the requisite mens rea may be
otherwise established, expressly or impliedly, the fact that death occurred in the course of a
felony is considered an aggravating circumstance which will, depending on the jurisdiction,
either allow or require imposition of the death penalty. See notes 56 & 103 and accompanying
text infra.
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LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION OF THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
The major limitations and the alternative of abolition
A consideration of the limitations on the felony-murder doctrine
would not be complete without allusion to the alternative of abolition. The
rule was eliminated in England over twenty years ago,' and its passing
apparently has not been mourned, perhaps because in most cases in which
a constructive intent theory would have been applied, intent could also be
inferred from the commission of a reckless act creating a grave risk to
human life, thus precluding the need for invocation of the felony-murder
doctrine.7 Only Kentucky and Hawaii, among American jurisdictions, have
followed England's example.' The Model Penal Code proposes what may
be considered a "transitional" statute,' which abolishes the rule, per se,
but does not eliminate the significance of the underlying felony in deter-
mining criminal liability.'"
Other states impose restrictions upon the rule only in instances
wherein its unfettered application has produced the harshest results.I The
limitations imposed upon the felony-murder doctrine by the various juris-
dictions may be discussed in five categories: (1) Application of the rule
only in cases involving inherently dangerous felonies; (2) Treatment of
traditional felony murder as a lesser degree of homicide; (3) Requirement
of a mens rea for felony-murder; (4) Recognition of merger and double
jeopardy considerations as a bar to felony-murder prosecutions; and (5)
Limitation of vicarious liability under the felony-murder rule.
Limiting the Felony-Murder Rule to Inherently Dangerous Felonies
Common law predicates for application of the felony-murder rule are
restricted to inherently dangerous felonies-acts "known to be dangerous
to life and likely in [themselves] to cause death""-or those which be-
o See Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1, discussed in note 4 supra.
The felony-murder rule was applied only rarely in the years immediately preceding its
abrogation. Its use was restricted to "cases where there was ample evidence that the act was
intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm or where it was known, or at least should have
been known, to be likely to have such effect." Prevezer, supra note 4, at 635.
See note 4 supra.
Professor Moreland has called the Model Penal Code provision a transitional statute, the
felony-murder provision of which serves little purpose but to maintain a historical link to the
past. Moreland, A Re-Examination of the Law of Homicide in 1971: The Model Penal Code,
59 Ky. L.J. 788, 803-04 (1971). Moreland suggests that "[ilt would be better to abolish the
felony murder rule and prosecute such killings as negligent murders." Id. at 304.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Prop. Official Draft 1962). For further discussion of the
Model Code provision, see notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
1 It is generally agreed that application of the felony-murder rule to impose vicarious crimi-
nal liability for the acts of a cofelon or third party produces the least justifiable results. See
notes 104-07 and accompanying text infra.
" Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Q.B. 1887) (arson of building to collect
insurance resulted in death of sleeping child). See Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Beard,
[1920] A.C. 479, 493 (rape victim smothered to prevent outcry).
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cause of the peculiar circumstances of their commission foreseeably would
create a grave risk of death or serious bodily harm. 3
While several jurisdictions allow the felony-murder rule to be applied
to any felony,'4 a clear majority of jurisdictions limit application of the rule
to homicides occurring in the course of certain statutorily enumerated
felonies." In those jurisdictions which designate only certain felonies as
grounds for a murder conviction, it appears to be the general rule that the
felonies enumerated are those deemed by the particular legislature to be
inherently dangerous; felonies which are not, however, regarded as danger-
13 See, e.g., Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox Crim. Cas. 635 (K.B. 1911) (abortion). For a thorough
discussion of common law predicates, see R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 47-54 (1952).
1 Any felony can serve as a predicate for a felony-murder indictment in Arkansas, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1502(1)(a) (1977) (first degree murder); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101(b)
(1978); Kansas, KAN. STAT. § 21-3401 (1974); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(2), .195
(West 1964 & Supp. 1977); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(c), (2)(e) (Supp. 1977);
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1(A)(31 (1972); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2502(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-9
(Supp. 1976); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974) (any felony
except voluntary or involuntary manslaughter); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03
(West 1974). Illinois requires that the predicate be a "forcible" felony other than involuntary
manslaughter. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976). Maine enumer-
ates nine serious felonies as predicates, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 202(1) (Spec. Supp. 1977),
and Massachusetts limits application of the rule to "crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970). New Hampshire employs a
rebuttable presumption of the requisite mens rea for "Class A felonies," N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:1-1(b) (1974).
A few states which specifically enumerate the predicate felonies add a catch-all phrase
such as "any other felony," MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-102 (1)(b) (Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975), or "any unlawful act ... the probable consequences [of which]
may be bloodshed," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-1 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
Though "any felony" may be the predicate, courts interpret this within the common-law
requirements-the felony must either be inherently dangerous or create a substantial risk of
death due to the peculiar circumstances of its commission. See, e.g., State v. Moffitt, 199
Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879 (1967); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
," See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.010 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-1501(1)(a) (1977) (capital murder); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 636(a)(6) (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE
§ 22-2401 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003,
-4006(2) (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 609.2 (West Supp. 1977-1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 408-410 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.316 (West Supp. 1977-1978);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-303 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2903.01(B) (Page 1975); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7B (West Supp. 1976-1977); OR. REv.
STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 16-3-
20(c)(a)(1) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402(4) (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)(d),
-203(1)(d) (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-31 to -33 (1975
& Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(c) (1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1977);
WYO. STAT. § 6-54(a) (Supp. 1975). A statutory taxonomy of felony-murder law in America
is presented in Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249,
269-74 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NEw CRIMINAL CODES].
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ous to life are not universally precluded from the enumerated lists."6 It does
appear likely that most jurisdictions which enumerate the predicate felon-
ies intend to prohibit application of the felony-murder rule where commis-
sion of an unlawful act creates a grave risk to life solely because of the
peculiar circumstances attending its commission. 7
The felonies most commonly enumerated as allowable predicates are
arson, rape, robbery, and burglary. 8 Kidnapping is often added to this
list. 9 Other felonies expressly specified are mayhem, 0 sexual molestation
6 See W. CLARKE & W. MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.07, at 658 (7th ed.
1967).
1 Some jurisdictions apparently do not intend to prohibit application of the rule where
peculiar circumstances make commission of an unenumerated felony a danger to life. Mon-
tana and North Carolina add as an alternative predicate "any other felony," while New
Jersey's statute permits an indictment to be based upon "any unlawful act the probable
consequences of which may be bloodshed."
11 States in which arson, rape, robbery, and burglary are the sole predicates are Alabama,
Alaska, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.15.010 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-54(a)(Supp. 1975). Arson and robbery are specified predicates in all of those juris-
dictions which limit application of the rule to enumerated felonies.
Rape is listed in 32 statutes. It is included in some recent statutes in other language. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976) ("sexual assault in the first or second de-
gree"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (1)(a) (West Supp. 1978) ("involuntary sexual battery");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(2) (West Supp. 1978) ("criminal sexual conduct ... with force
or violence" sole predicate felony for first-degree murder indictment; all other felony-murder
is third degree); NES. REv. STAT. § 28-303 (1977) (sexual assault with use or threat of force,
coercion, or deception); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976) ("gross sexual imposition").
The revised language is an apparent attempt to remove sexual distinctions from the criminal
statutes. Other jurisdictions achieve like effect by adding sodomy, or "deviate sexual inter-
course by force or threat" or similar language. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(a)(2) (Burns
Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-1 (West Supp.
1977-1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b)
(1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)(d), -203(1)(d) (Supp. 1977). Some jurisdictions in-
clude lesser sexual offenses. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975)("sexual
abuse"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)(d), -203(1)(d) (Supp. 1977) ("aggravated sexual
assault"). Sexual molestation of a child is included in some statutes. See note 21 and accom-
panying text infra.
Burglary is listed in 35 states. The District of Columbia enumerates "armed housebreak-
ing" without mentioning burglary. D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973). Daytime housebreaking is
added to burglary in Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1977), and, in South Carolina
housebreaking is one of the felonies which may predicate a capital murder conviction. S.C.
CODE § 16-3-20(1)(g) (1976). Larceny and extortion are added to the felony-murder provision
of Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West Supp. 1977-1978), and larceny is
included in South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 16-3-20(1)(f) (1976), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2402(4) (1975).
g1 There are 25 jurisdictions that include kidnapping as an enumerated felony. It is the only
predicate added to arson, rape, robbery and burglary in Mississippi. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1977) (five enumerated felonies for capital murder). Felonious restraint is
an added predicate in North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976). Vehicular
piracy serves as a predicate for capital murder in Arkansas. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(a)
(1977). Air piracy and hijacking have been introduced as predicate felonies in a few recent
statutes. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text infra.
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of a child,2' sodomy,2 and escape.13 Recent additions to the statutory predi-
cates are air piracy, 4 hijacking, 5 extortion, 26 use of a bomb,"1 and distribu-
tion of narcotics. 21 Included among the predicate felonies are crimes which
may arguably be without inherent danger to human life, such as storehouse
breaking29 and burning of a barn or tobacco house.30 Where legislatures
have created such questionable predicates, it would appear to be funda-
mentally unfair to utilize such means to elevate a homicide to murder. 3'
In those jurisdictions accepting the common law standard for estab-
lishing whether a homicide occurrring in the course of a particular unlawful
act may be the subject of a felony-murder indictment,2 the courts must
determine whether the underlying felony was "inherently dangerous."
While California courts, which have created a somewhat controversial 3
,* Mayhem is included in the provision of Arizona, ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (Supp.
1957-1977); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1978); District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE § 22-2401 (1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-4003, -4006(2) (Supp. 1977); and Maryland,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1977).
1 Molestation of a child is one of the enumerated felonies in Arizona, ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-452 (Supp. 1957-1977); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1978); and
Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (1977).
2 See note 18 supra.
" Escape is among the listed predicates in 11 states. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(a)
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 636(a)(7)
(Supp. 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
410 (1977); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-5-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
2903.01(b) (Page 1975); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (West Supp. 1976-1977); OE. REv.
STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1975). Resisting arrest is specifically added in Rhode Island. R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp. 1978).
24 Florida and Tennessee have included air piracy in their felony-murder provisions. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402(4) (1975).
'5 See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-303 (1977).
.2 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (Supp. 1977-1978).
27 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402 (1975).
21 Distribution of narcotics is among the listed felonies in Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04
(West Supp. 1978). The use of this predicate has stirred some controversy in light of the
difficulty in establishing proximate cause. See State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 511 P.2d 623
(1973), discussed in Comment, Prospective Homicidal Responsibility for the Heroin Dealer
in Arizona, 1975 Amiz. ST. L.J. 97, 106-09.
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1977).
30 Id. § 409.
" See, e.g., People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971) (en banc),
wherein the Supreme Court of California refused to apply the felony-murder doctrine to the
felony of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The court found it difficult "to understand how
any offense of mere passive possession can be considered to supply the element of malice in
a murder prosecution." Id. at 43, 489 P.2d at 1371, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
32 In addition to the states listed in note 14 supra, California and Arizona courts have created
a second-degree felony-murder rule based upon the common law. See Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz.
201, 65 P.2d 1141 (1937); People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388 P.2d 892, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1964).
" See note 32 supra. See generally Comment, The California Doctrine of Felony Murder: An
Enigma Wrapped Up In a Riddle, 7 U.W.L.A.L. REv. 150 (1975), wherein it is suggested that
the lack of statutory authority for second-degree felony-murder should bar its application.
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common law felony-murder rule under that state's second degree homicide
statute," look to the elements of a felony "in the abstract [and] not .. .
to the specific facts of the case,"35 most courts consider both the nature of
the felony and the circumstances of its commission to be relevant to
whether there is inherent danger in the commission of the crime."6 Where
the circumstances of the commission of the felony are to be considered, the
desirability of definitive statutory guidelines is apparent. If the rule was
applied to all felonies which were committed under circumstances which
create a risk of death, it would be very easy to find that risk where death,
in fact, was the result. Since application of the felony-murder doctrine can
eliminate mens rea as an element necessary for conviction, thus precluding
use of defenses associated with that element, 37 it seems appropriate to limit
its use to situations in which, in objective terms, the "inherent danger"
ascribed to the intended felony is sufficient to justify the transfer of intent
from felony to homicide.
Felony-Murder as a Lesser Degree of Homicide
Those jurisdictions that seek to establish culpability as the standard
for the fixing of criminal liability, but are unwilling to abolish constructive
malice altogether, are able to accomplish their goal by lessening the degree
of homicide-and thereby the degree of punishment-associated with
felony-murder. In Alaska, felony-murder not purposely or maliciously
committed is considered manslaughter,8 and, in Ohio, homicide occur-
ring in the course of a nonenumerated felony is deemed involuntary man-
slaughter." Maine and Wisconsin statutes have reduced felony-murder
to third degree homicide,'" and four states give felony-murder the status
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1978).
People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 38, 39-40, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41 (1971)
(emphasis in original).
u See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del.), aff'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (doctrine should
apply only to felonies "which are, by nature or circumstances, foreseeably dangerous to
human life"). See also People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68, cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1023 (1966) (theft from United States mail by stealth inherently dangerous); State v. Cham-
bers, 524 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976) (car theft
inherently dangerous); State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409 (1973) (discharging
firearm into occupied property inherently dangerous); Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d
755 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974) (daytime breaking and entering and larceny
inherently dangerous).
See notes 120-29 and accompanying text infra.
, See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.15.010-040 (1970). It has been suggested that the grading of felony-
murder as manslaughter was an inadvertent abolition of the rule in that state. See New
Criminal Codes, supra note 15, at 259. The same commentator believes that legislative error
was the reason for the lower grading of felony-predicated homicide convictions in Oklahoma,
Utah, and Idaho. Id. at 259-60.
3, OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(a) (Page 1975). Ohio requires mens rea for a felony-murder
conviction. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
I ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 203(1) (West Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 1958).
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of second degree murder." Radical change in the degree of crime charged
is a viable alternative to abolition of the rule, since the lesser degree of
criminal liability imposed is consistent with the degree of culpability in-
volved.'" The public need not fear that felons would thereby escape just
treatment if death were to result from an intentional felonious act, since
higher degrees of homicide would be charged if the requisite mens rea
were present. Malice could still be implied from the commission of an act
which is imminently dangerous to life,'3 but such malice would remain a
required element of the crime, necessitating proof of its existence and
permitting the assertion of any applicable defenses."
Requiring a Mens Rea for Felony-Murder
It has been said that the felony-murder rule is crucial to a murder
conviction only in two cases: when an unforeseeable, accidental death
occurs in the course of a felony; and, when the state seeks to establish
vicarious criminal liability for death caused by an accomplice or a third
party. 5 In other homicides, since the requisite mens rea is amenable to
proof, the rule is not essential to the establishment of criminal liability;
in such cases it serves only to present an accused with procedural obstacles
to his defense."
The American Law Institute, in its Model Penal Code, recommends
that a mens rea be required for all felony-murder prosecutions.'4 The Code
provision, which represents a compromise between the drafters' ardent
desire to abolish the felony-murder doctrine4 and the realization on their
part that conservative legislatures would balk at such drastic action, 41
creates a rebuttable presumption of recklessness if the actor is engaged in,
" LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b(I)(b)
(1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
" See Anachronism, supra note 1, at 432-35.
13 See Prevezer, supra note 4, at 625..
4 The elimination of defenses relating to mens rea is one reason for strong criticism of the
felony-murder doctrine. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
11 See, e.g., Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51, 52 (1956);
Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 191, 203-09.
, See notes 120-29 and accompanying text infra.
'7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1) (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
' See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
" See Denzer, supra note 4, at 260; Wechsler, supra note 4, at 1446. Denzer indicates that
elimination of the felony-murder rule in New York would be "drastic" in view of the fact that
"[piractically every jurisdiction in this country accepts the felony murder doctrine." Denzer,
supra note 4, at 260. Acknowledging that there is "something to be said for" determining
punishment based on culpability and that New York's felony-murder statute bases punish-
ment on the result (retribution), Denzer, one of the drafters of New York's present penal law,
nonetheless defends retention of the provision in view of the political and social climate:
"[New York's legislators] would never, at least in these times, have enacted a penal law
without the felony murder rule. . . . [Aln era of street crimes and riots . . . has caused the
legislature to stiffen its back." Id. (emphasis added).
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or is an accomplice to, the commission of, the attempted commission of,
or flight after the commission of certain enumerated felonies. 5 At present,
New Hampshire is the only state to have adopted similar statutory lan-
guage.5
Alaska and Ohio require that the homicide be caused "purposely" to
constitute murder.52 Delaware requires recklessness or criminal negli-
gence. 53 Texas' felony-murder statute applies only when, in the course of
and in furtherance of a felonious purpose, the defendant commits an act
"clearly dangerous to human life" that causes death.54 In Tennessee, the
killing must be "willfull [sic], deliberate and malicious" in order to con-
stitute felony-murder.55
In several states, the fact that a homicide occurred during the course
of a felony may have the effect of raising the crime to a capital offense
where the requisite mental culpability can be proved by other means."6
10 The statute provides:
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder
when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indiffer-
ence to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if
the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
The creation of a rebuttable presumption, which places the burden of going forward with
evidence on the defendant, is seen by some as transforming a rule of law into a rule of
evidence. See New Criminal Codes, supra note 15, at 261. This approach raises constitutional
questions in light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), wherein the Supreme Court held that
due process requires that each element of a particular crime charged must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to support a conviction. But see notes 108-19 and accompanying
text infra. In the event the presumption is rebutted, the defendant could be found guilty of
manslaughter.
51 New Hampshire's second-degree murder statute provides that a defendant will be subject
to punishment of life imprisonment if he recklessly causes death "under circumstances mani-
festing an extreme indifference to the value of human life." Recklessness is presumed "if the
actor causes the death by the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of, or in an attempt
to commit, or in immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any class A
felony." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b(I)(b) (1974).
In addition, a person may be found guilty of first degree murder, punishable by life
imprisonment with no parole, if he "[kinowingly causes the death of . . . [a]nother before,
after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit robbery or burglary
while armed with a deadly weapon, the death being caused by the use of such weapon." N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (1974).
'5 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.010 (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975).
See DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 636(a)(2), (6). Recklessness in the course of and in furtherance of
any felony may be a predicate, but criminal negligence is sufficient only for deaths caused in
the course and furtherance of enumerated felonies of rape, kidnapping, arson, and robbery.
See id.
" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
s' TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402(4) (1975).
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b(3) (West Supp.
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A requirement of proof of mens rea as a condition precedent to appli-
cation of a felony-murder rule allows the defendant the benefit of defenses
relating to mens rea which would otherwise be precluded. 7 Such an ap-
proach would virtually eliminate the major objectionable feature of the
felony-murder rule: that it can be used to create strict criminal liability.
Merger and Double Jeopardy Considerations
There is no double jeopardy involved in convictions for both felony;
murder and the underlying felony if the underlying felony is considered a
separate and distinct offense.58 In some cases, however, the underlying
felony is part of a continuous course of conduct culminating in the homi-
cide, as in the case of felonious assault resulting in the victim's death. In
this instance, the underlying felony is said to merge into the homicide."
Such circumstances raise difficult questions regarding the validity of dual
convictions, 0 or of use of the felony as predicate for a felony-murder
charge.'
1977); Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 507.020(2)(b) (Supp. 1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West
Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413b(3) (iii), (iv), (viii) (1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:1(I)(b) (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1A(3) (1972), TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §
19.03(a)(2),(b) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76.5-202(1)(d), (2) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-31(a), (d), (e) (Supp. 1976) (kidnapping, robbery with deadly weapon, rape); Wvo.
STAT. § 6-54(a), (b) (i)-(x) (Supp. 1975).
5 See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
5 See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 61 Misc. 2d 1043, 308 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Oneida County Ct.
1970); People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska, 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1959), affd mem., 11 App. Div. 2d 906, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (4th Dep't 1960),
appeal denied, 9 N.Y.2d 862, 175 N.E.2d 818, 216 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1961).
Double jeopardy is a consideration, however, where both offenses grew out of the same
transaction. See State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein, 184 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); State
v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 A. 416 (N.J. 1919).
5, See Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the New
York Statutes, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 288, 298-301 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Arent].
The merger problem did not arise in connection with felony-murder at early common law;
since all felonies were punishable by death, it made little difference whether the accused was
hanged for committing the felony, the murder, or both. Quinn, Homicides Under the Colorado
Criminal Code, 49 DEN. L.J. 137, 146 (1972). Another reason that merger did not arise as a
problem at common law was that an intent to cause grievous bodily harm, or knowledge that
the acts causing death will probably cause such harm, was in itself sufficient mens rea for
the killing to constitute murder. Only in states such as New York, where the legislature by
statute has attempted precisely to define offenses such as manslaughter and murder, is the
merger problem significant, since application of the felony-murder rule may act to change
the degree of homicide which may be charged. See Arent, supra at 299.
0 See Busch & Fulgoni, Diminished Capacity Applied to the Felony-Murder Rule, 47 L.A.
B. BULL. 291, 295-96 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Busch]; Note, The California Supreme
Court Assaults the Felony-Murder Rule, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1060-61 (1970); Comment,
Merger and the California Felony-Murder Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 250, 285-86 (1912)
[hereinafter cited as California Felony-Murder Rule]. See also State v. Thompson, 280 N.C.
202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
"1 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 440, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969) (en banc)
(burglary with intent to commit assault not a valid predicate); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d
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The double jeopardy clause62 bars conviction of the predicate felony
after a conviction of felony-murder when it was necessary to prove the
underlying felony in order to establish the requisite mens rea for a murder
conviction. In Harris v. Oklahoma," for example, the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction for armed robbery because the defendant has pre-
viously been convicted of a murder occurring in the course of the robbery.
In this case, proof of all the elements of the felony was a prerequisite to a
conviction for felony-murder.' The double jeopardy clause does not ac-
tually lessen the impact of a felony-murder charge upon a defendant, for
he still is liable for murder. It does, however, accord with the underlying
principle of the merger doctrine that a felon should not suffer double pun-
ishment for action which should only constitute a single crime.
The merger doctrine provides that a felony may serve as the predi-
cate for a felony-murder charge only if it is established that there was an
intent to commit the felony which did not constitute intent to harm the
victim. 5 Furthermore, specific intent to commit the underlying felony may
be required for a murder conviction, even though general intent would be
sufficient for a conviction of the felony itself." This aspect of merger is not
universally applied; in some states it is possible to predicate a felony-
murder conviction on such general intent crimes as unlawful possession of
a firearm. 7
To aid in determining the appropriateness of a felony-murder charge,
California courts have adopted an "included in fact" test, which takes into
522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969) (assault with a deadly weapon an improper
predicate). But see Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975) (aggravated assault
an allowable predicate for felony-murder conviction).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
U 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam).
6, Id. A companion of the defendant had killed a store clerk during the robbery. The Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals noted that "[in a felony murder case, the proof of the
underlying felony is needed to prove the intent necessary for a felony murder conviction."
Harris v. State, 555 P.2d 76, 80-81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). That court nevertheless affirmed
the defendant's conviction for robbery despite his prior conviction for felony-murder.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that "[w]hen, as here, conviction
for a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction for the lesser crime, robbery
with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after convic-
tion for the greater one." 433 U.S. at 683 (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)).
65 See Arent, supra note 59, at 298. In People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (1969) (en banc), the California Supreme Court refused to allow assault with a
deadly weapon to predicate a felony-murder conviction:
To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from
considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been
committed as a result of a felonious assault-a category which includes the great
majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor
in the law.
Id. at 536, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
" See Busch, supra note 60, at 294-95.
07 See State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879 (1967).
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account the relationship between actus reus and intent. Under this ap-
proach, a felony may not operate as the predicate for a felony-murder
charge if it is included in the act which causes death-if there is actually
only one continuous act culminating in death."8
While the merger doctrine acts in most instances to protect the rights
of the defendant, its application under certain circumstances may produce
an anomalous result. For instance, a person may be charged with felony-
murder in connection with a death occurring in the course of a burglary
only if the defendant did not enter the house for the purpose of assaulting
or killing the victim. Thus, illegal entry for the sole purpose of stealing
property may be a valid predicate for a felony-murder charge, while illegal
entry for the purpose of inflicting harm on the victim would merge in the
ensuing homicide."
Despite the anomaly which may be created by such an application of
the merger doctrine, the rule provides important safeguards for one ac-
cused of murder in the course of a lesser-included felony."0 Use of the
felony-murder rule in such instances would allow conviction without proof
of the mens rea requisite for an intentional murder conviction; the merger
doctrine requires that the issue of mens rea be placed before the jury.
Limiting Vicarious Liability Under the Felony-Murder Rule.
The most criticized use of the felony-murder rule is the imposition of
criminal liability upon a felon for the death of a third party or cofelon
caused by the act of a cofelon or third party.7 Many jurisdictions impose
" See, e.g., People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388 P.2d 892, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 940 (1964); People v. Chavez, 37 Cal. 2d 656, 234 P.2d 632 (1952). See also Comment,
Taming the Felony-Murder Rule, 14 SAWTA Cmu , LAW. 97, 99 (1973); California Felony-
Murder Rule, supra note 60, at 253 & n.16 (1972).
11 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969) (en banc),
wherein the California Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction based upon felonious
entry with intent to commit assault with a deadly weapon. The court condemned as
"bootstrapping" an approach whereby an entry, which was felonious only because there was
present an intent to assault, could serve as a predicate for murder, even though the assault
was an integral part of the homicide. Id. at 440-41, 462 P.2d at 28-29, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
One commentator suggests that the court's reasoning is that:
[Slince the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing, a felon
who enters a dwelling to kill or who uses a weapon for that purpose is in no way deterred
by the rule. . . . This differs from the situation in which a robber, whose prime
objective is money, is faced with a decision as to whether or not to eliminate possible
witnesses to the robbery.
Busch, supra note 60, at 295. It is submitted that the rule need not be applied in either
situation, since intent to kill may be readily shown.
7o See Busch, supra note 60, at 295.
71 See, e.g., Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 50 (1956); Note, Limitations on the Applicability of the Felony-Murder Rule in
California, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1345 (1971); Note, Criminal Liability of a Participant in
Crime for the Death of a Fellow Participant, 22 SYACUSE L. REV. 1065 (1971).
Various case comments have assailed application of the felony-murder rule on a proxi-
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some limitations-either statutory or judicial in nature-on vicarious lia-
bility for felony murder.
Killing Must Be "in Furtherance of" the Felony
While the classic application of the felony-murder rule is its use to
impose liability upon a felon when a death occurs in the course of a felon-
ious act, the rule has received expansive treatment in many statutes so as
to extend to deaths occurring in the course of attempted felonies," as 4rell
as in the course of flight from felonies or attempted felonies.73 Some legisla-
tures, however, have elected to limit application of the rule to deaths
caused by an act done in furtherance of the felonious intent.' Relatively
mate cause theory in cases of vicarious liability. See, e.g., 52 Cm.-KENT. L. REv. 184 (1975)
(discussing People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
913 (1975)); 74 DICK. L. REv. 756 (1970) (discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers,
438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970)); 74 W. VA. L. REv. 204 (1971) (discussing Taylor v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970) (en banc)).
" See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.010 (1970); AlEz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-452 (Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501(1)(a), -1502(1)(a) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 636(a)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1977);
D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE
§§ 18-4003, -4006(2) (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (West
Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3401 (1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp.
1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (Supp. 1977-1978); MwNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.185(2), .195
(West 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(c), (2)(e) (Supp. 1977); MONT. RV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-5-102(1)(b) (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b)
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1-a(I)(b)(1) to (3), -b(I)(b) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:113-1 (West Supp. 1977-1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1(A)(3) (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
16-01(3) (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B), .04(A) (Page 1975); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.115(1)(b) (1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b), (d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (Supp. 1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)(d), -203(1)(d) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (1974);
VA. CODE § 18.2-32 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c) (1977); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-1 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54(a) (Supp.
1975).
11 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501(1)(a), -1502(1)(a) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-
102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit.
11, § 636(a)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1977); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-5-102(1)(b) (1977); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b(I)(b) (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b)(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)
(d), -203(1)(d) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(c) (1977).
1, See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501(1)(a), -1502(1)(a) (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b)
(Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §
636(a)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1975); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
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few state legislatures have so acted, however. The limitation of criminal
liability in this manner is primarily within the province of the courts.75
Although criminal liability may be established upon a showing of
proximate cause between the commission of the felony and death, the
common law applies an "agency theory" to vicarious liability for felony-
murder." Although some controversial California cases, as well as a recent
Illinois decision, held that a showing of proximate cause is sufficient to
uphold convictions for felony-murder," the trend in most jurisdictions has
been to utilize the agency theory which requires that the act causing death
be done in furtherance of the common felonious design."8
There are two widely recognized exceptions to application of the
agency theory of vicarious liability: (1) when the victim is used as a
"shield" by the felon or a cofelon;7 9 and (2) when death occurs as a result
of a gun battle initiated or engaged in by the felon or a cofelon.' In these
situations, the agency test is disregarded in favor of the assumption that
proximate cause is sufficient to establish criminal liability.' At least one
commentator has noted that the felony-murder rule is an unnecessary tool
for the establishment of liability in those situations contemplated by these
Is See, e.g., Comment, Taming the Felony-Murder Rule, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 97, 99 (1973).
Such a restriction has as its primary effect the limitation of vicarious liability. One commen-
tator discusses judicial limitation: "Restrictions upon the application of the felony-murder
doctrine are common in nearly all jurisdictions because a broad interpretation of the provision
would obviously produce harsh results." 25 ALB. L. REv. 153, 156 (1961). See also Note,
Limitations on the Applicability of the Felony-Murder Rule in California, 22 HASTINGs L.J.
.1327, 1347-48 (1971), wherein the author, in discussing Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970) (en banc), criticizes the decision on the ground
that "the Taylor court has made the felony-murder rule applicable to defendants who have
done no more than commit the underlying felony." Id. at 1348. See note 77 and accompanying
text infra.
Is For a discussion of the common law agency approach, see People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48,
51-53, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738-39, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331-33 (1960), wherein the New York Court
of Appeals outlined the early American view which adhered to the agency theory of liability.
" See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970)
(en banc), discussed in 74 W. VA. L. REv. 204 (1971); People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203,
82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970), discussed in 24 ARK. L. REv. 342
(1970); People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), discussed in 52 CHI.-KENr
L. REv. 184 (1975).
7S See 52 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 184, 195 & n.55 (1975). The agency theory was firmly established
at common law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 543 (1863).
In Campbell, rioters were charged with felony-murder for the death of fellow rioters killed by
law officers resisting the mob. While finding that "a person engaged in the commission of an
unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or necessarily
flow from it," id., the court held that application of the rule under the facts presented would
be "extraordinary." Id. at 545-46.
" For an example of a "shield" case, see Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961
(1900).
" For examples of "gun battle" cases, see Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955);
People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
8, Comment, The Felony-Murder Doctrine Under the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, 51 ORE.
L. REv. 603, 609 (1972).
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exceptions.Y In both the shield and gun battle cases, both actus reus and
mens rea may be established independently, without resort to the felony
predicate, i.e., the holding of the victim as a shield or the initiation of a
gun battle arguably constitutes sufficient actus reus, and the cognizance
and conscious disregard of a grave risk of death created by such an act
arguably is sufficient mens rea to support a murder conviction.3
In view of the particularly harsh results achieved in instances of trans-
ferred intent, which obviates the necessity for the prosecution to establish
proof of either actus reus or mens rea, a handful of states statutorily re-
strict use of the felony-murder rule to cases in which death is caused by a
felon or cofelon." In this manner, these jurisdictions avoid a situation in
which the act of a third party is imputed to the accused. Four of these
states,u5 along with one other,81 require that the victim be a nonfelon.
Establishing an Affirmative Defense
In an effort to alleviate some of the harshness inherent in the applica-
tion of the felony-murder doctrine to accomplice liability situations, sev-
eral states include in their homicide statutes an affirmative defense to a
charge of felony-murder. 7 The affirmative defense established under the
New York statute requires a showing that the defendant
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of
a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant in-
tended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical
injury 8
32 Id. at 608-09.
See id.
" The 9 states which include such a limitation in their statutes are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1502(1)(a) (1977); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977);
Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1977); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-
A, § 202(1) (Spec. Supp. 1977); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(c), (2)(e) (Supp.
1977); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1975); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(c) (1977).
1 Connecticut, New York, Oregon, and Washington include this provision. For specific stat-
ute citations, see note 84 supra.
U See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501(2), -1502(2) (1977); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (1974);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (3) (McKinney
1975); N.D, CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115(3) (1975).
u See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975).
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Colorado has enacted the additional requirement that the defendant
"[e]ndeavored to disengage himself from the commission of the underly-
ing crime . . . immediately upon having reasonable grounds to believe
that another participant is armed with a deadly weapon ....
This effort to ameliorate the injustice of applying strict liability stan-
dards to an unknowing and unwilling accomplice is recognized realistically
to be of little effect, since the burden placed on the defendant is nearly
impossible to meet." It no longer appears, however, that the affirmative
defense is subject to any question of constitutional validity, in view of the
Supreme Court's recent holdings regarding the allocation of the burden of
proving affirmative defenses."
CRITICISMS OF THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the significant efforts in many jurisdictions to curtail
the harsh effects of the felony-murder rule by statutory and judicial restric-
tions, its continued existence, at least in some diminished form, is assured.
Much of the vigorous criticism directed at the doctrine stems from the fact
that the many possible limitations have not been universally adopted,"
but some critics find any application of the felony-murder rule, however
limited, either unnecessary 3 or contrary to the fundamental principles of
our legal system.9 The basic criticisms made are that: (1) The felony-
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2)(f) (1974).
" See New Criminal Codes, supra note 15, at 264. The Oregon Criminal Law Revision Com-
mission acknowledged that "[ilt is not anticipated that this defense will often be success-
ful." ORE. CRIn. L. REV. COMM'N, PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 88, commentary at 87 (Final
Draft & Report 1970), quoted in Arthur, Homicide, Assault, Kidnapping and Related
Offenses, 51 ORE. L. REv. 459, 468 (1972).
" See note 119 and accompanying text infra.
Cf. 9 MAR. J. OF PRAc. & PRoc. 517, 532 (1976) (adoption of vicarious liability standards
portends the end of efforts to apply the doctrine strictly).
11 It is clear that a felon may be said to have intended the natural and probable consequences
of his act. Therefore, intent can be inferred from perpetration of a felony involving a high
risk of death or serious injury. See Anachronism, supra note 1, at 434. It has been argued that
in most cases in which a murder conviction is obtained, sufficient intent may be inferred to
obviate the need for a resort to the felony-murder rule. See Comment, Felony Murder in
Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 685, wherein the author states: "If the circumstances show, as they
often do, that the defendant's actions indicated an intent to kill or knowledge of the probabil-
ity of death, the defendant could be convicted of murder [without charging felony murder]."
Id. at 693.
" See Hippard, supra note 1, at 1040, wherein the author states that "[strict liability crimes
are alien to our criminal law and to our Constitution; they are unconstitutional anomalies
that the Supreme Court should have suppressed long ago." Id.
Another commentator makes clear that use of the felony-murder rule in those jurisdic-
tions which do not apply the common law definition of murder is even more alien to the
principle of criminal liability based on culpability since those jurisdictions ordinarily impose
a higher degree of liability for the crime than would be the case at common law:
[U]nlike the relation of constructive malice to common law murder, felony murder
broadens the scope of first degree murder by supplying proof of a mental state in law
that may not exist in fact. . . . [Tlhis . . . undermines the principle of culpability
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murder rule has outlived its purpose; (2) Vicarious liability stretches the
rule too far; (3) Relieving the prosecution from the burden of proving the
element of intent is unconstitutional; and (4) Unjust procedural advan-
tages are given to the prosecution.15
The Felony-Murder Rule Has Outlived Its Purpose
The felony-murder rule was developed at a time when retribution was
regarded as an important goal in setting the appropriate punishment for
the commission of a particular crime." Indeed, it is "well-suited to a retri-
butive system of punishment,"97 since it allows imposition of a stiff penalty
on one who personally or vicariously contributes to the death of another,
regardless of intent. As a modern theory of punishment, however, retribu-
tion claims a number of justifications which simply do not appear suffi-
cient to sanction the automatic imposition of liability for murder upon the
perpetrator of a nonintentional homicide.9 Deterrence, a more appropriate
justification for meting out such punishment, is furthered by the felony-
murder rule only marginally, if at all. It is axiomatic that one cannot deter
negligence.99 Where death results from an intentional or reckless act, the
rule is not essential to the proof of mens rea. The rule is a necessity,
therefore, only to establish criminal liability for negligent or accidental
death.1' Since neither negligence nor accident can be deterred, the felony-
murder rule cannot fulfill such a purpose. Holmes suggested that the impo-
sition of more severe punishments for the underlying felonies would be a
more effective deterrent. 1 More recent commentators suggest that imposi-
tion of greater penalties for felonies committed with a dangerous weapon
based on mental state. Accordingly, felony murder should be abolished.
Anachronism, supra note 1, at 432-33. See also note 139 infra.
" Other criticisms include the complaint that tort principles such as foreseeability and proxi-
mate causality should not be applied to criminal law, see, e.g., 9 DuQ. L. REv. 542, 546 (1971),
and that broad extension of the res gestae-to include flight and attempt-includes acts
beyond the scope of the felony, see Comment, The Felony Murder Rule in Ohio, 17 OHIO ST.
L.J. 130, 138 (1956).
11 It has frequently been noted that the doctrine "has its origin in the common law during
an era when nearly all felonies were punishable by death." People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 51,
167 N.E.2d 736, 738, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1960) (citing People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159,
174-75 (1834)); see note 1 supra.
" Comment, The Felony-Murder Doctrine Under the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, 51 ORE.
L. REv. 603, 610 (1972).
1' For a discussion of retribution as a rationale for the punishment of crime, see S. KADISH &
M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 6 (3d ed. 1975).
" For instance, it has been observed that "no evidence whatever supports the assumption
that, in some mysterious way, insensitive negligent persons are improved or deterred by their
punishment or that of other negligent persons." Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Ex-
cluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 642 (1963).
'" See Comment, Felony Murder in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 685, 693-94. See also Ludwig,
Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51 (1956), wherein the author
includes vicarious liability as the only other necessary application of the rule. Id. at 51-52.
01 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 57-58 (1881).
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would be more appropriate. 10 2 Both approaches would seek to deter felony-
murder by deterring the commission of the felony itself. While this is a
noble goal, one undeterred by the penalty for the felony could not be
deterred from committing a negligent or accidental death in the course of
the felony, and it is submitted that if the penalty for the underlying felony
were nearly as harsh as that for murder, the result might be to encourage
the killing of the victim to preclude later identification. The better ap-
proach is imposition of particularly severe punishment for deaths occurring
in the course of a felony for which mens rea is independently established. 3
This avoids attempting the impossible-deterrence of accident or negli-
gence-and focuses on deterring the felon from further intentional trans-
gression. Such a scheme accords with the modern trend toward establish-
ment of mental culpability as the basis of criminal liability.
Vicarious Liability Creating Strict Liability for Crime Stretches the
Felony-Murder Rule Beyond Reason
There are four siiuations in which the felony-murder rule may operate
to establish an accused's criminal liability for the acts of another: (1) death
of a cofelon by an act of a cofelon; (2) death of a third party by an act of a
third party; (3) death of a cofelon by an act of a third party; and (4) death
of a third party by an act of a cofelon. Application of the felony-murder
rule in any of these situations is criticized as the imposition of strict liabil-
ity for crime,1'0 except where agency principles establish liability in the
death of a third party by the act of a cofelon.' 5
The death of a cofelon by his own act or by the act of a cofelon is
difficult to justify as a predicate for a felony-murder charge. Vicarious
liability ordinarily attaches in felony-murder situations only when the
death occurs in furtherance of the common felonious design. It is apparent,
however, that in all ordinary instances, the cofelon's assistance may be
essential to the successful completion of that design. Therefore, it would
seem illogical to conclude that an accidental killing of a cofelon by another
cofelon should be cast as an act sufficiently in furtherance of the common
felonious design so as to permit application of the agency theory.
The death of a third party by an act of another third party, as in the
102 See Comment, The Felony-Murder Doctrine Under the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, 51
ORE. L. REV. 603, 610 (1972); Note, The Felony-Murder Rule-A Re-Examination, 5 SArrA
CLARA LAW. 172, 178-79 (1965).
03 In this instance, "[plrobably the most likely person to be deterred from the use of fire-
arms or deadly weapons or from resorting to measures of violence is the professional crimi-
nal." Prevezer, supra note 4, at 649.
10, See Hippard, supra note 1, at 1045.
"' See, e.g., People v. Golson, 32 111. 2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court
of Illinois noted that "where two or more persons engage in conspiracy to commit robbery
and an offer is murdered . . . each of the conspirators is guilty of murder . . . . [Un-
less the plan was to kill any person attempting to apprehend the conspirators. . . .the plan
would be inane." Id. at 402, 207 N.E.2d at 73-74.
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case of a police officer mistakenly shooting another police officer or a
bystander, may be justifiably imputed to a felon in the case of a gun battle
or where the victim was used to shield the felon. In such a case, however,
sufficient mens rea may be established by the reckless disregard shown for
life, without resort to the felony-murder rule. It is submitted that where
the act causing death was not a response to any act of the felon, there
should be no finding of proximate cause, and thus no imposition of crimi-
nal liability.
The death of a cofelon by an act of a third party is the least justifiable
of predicates for a felony-murder indictment, since "[i]t would be irra-
tional to impute a legally justifiable homicide to a participating felon and,
by reason of such imputation, change the character of the act from one of
justifiable homicide to one of criminal culpability.""'
Even where a third party dies as a result of an act of a cofelon, applica-
tion of the felony-murder rule would produce arbitrary results. If the act
was done intentionally or recklessly in furtherance of the common plan, all
felons involved will be criminally responsible for murder without implica-
tion of a mens rea by operation of the agency theory. 0 Where felons jointly
create a situation which holds a grave risk of death, they may all be found
guilty of murder without resort to the felony-murder rule. In contrast, if
the homicide was the intentional or reckless act of one felon, performed
independently of any common plan, it is appropriate that that party alone
be held fully accountable.
Thus, where vicarious liability under the felony-murder doctrine is
most readily justifiable, that rule is not essential to the establishment of
criminal liability; where its application is necessary for that purpose, it is
unjustifiable.
The Conclusive Presumption of Mens Rea in Felony-Murder Is Unconsti-
tutional
In many states, as at common law, the felony-murder statute is con-
sidered to embody a statutory conclusive presumption of the mens rea
requisite for a murder conviction.'"' Under this formulation, mens rea re-
mains an element of murder; it is proved, however, simply by showing the
commission of a felony, and the question of premeditation or the presence
of malice aforethought is never actually at issue in the case. It has been
argued that the conclusive presumption of mens rea in felony-murder cases
,0 See Quinn, Homicides Under the Colorado Criminal Code, 49 DEN. L.J. 137, 148 (1972)
(citing Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. Rlv.
50 (1956)).
'° See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
10 See, e.g., People v. Ketchel, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 456 P.2d 660, 79 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1969); People
v. Bufkin, 43 Mich. App. 585, 204 N.W.2d 762 (1972), aff'd, 48 Mich. App. 290, 210 N.W.2d
390 (1973); State v. Jewel, 473 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. 1971); State v. Kaufman, 183 Neb. 817, 164
N.W.2d 469 (1969); Commonwealth v: Yuknavich, 448 Pa. 502, 295 A.2d 290 (1972).
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is constitutionally invalid in that it does not comport with due process
guidelines established by the Supreme Court in relation to statutory pre-
sumptions.09
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Court has upheld statu-
tory presumptions as a valid legislative exercise,"' but this sanction has
been tempered by evolving constitutional limitations upon what may be
presumed. These limitations have the effect of requiring a significant de-
gree of probability that the element of the crime which is presumed does,
in fact, exist."' The Court first reasoned, in regard to a criminal statutory
presumption, that it "cannot be sustained if there be no rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed."1 "' Subse-
quent decisions have delineated two possible criteria which apparently
have been used by the Court to apply this rational connection test: whether
the presumed fact "is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend;""' and, a "more exacting reasonable-doubt
standard normally applicable in criminal cases.""' No holding has yet
required sole reliance on a reasonable-doubt standard for evaluating the
propriety of a criminal conclusive presumption,"' but it would appear
lot For an excellent analysis of the felony-murder doctrine as a conclusive presumption, and
the argument that due process standards cannot be reconciled with the conclusive presump-
tion of intent to kill, see Constitutional Limitations, supra note 3.
"' See, e.g., Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (need only be "some
rational connection" between what is proved and what is ultimately presumed).
" See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943);
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
"' Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). In Tot, the Court considered the statutory
presumption involved in § 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 902(f), 52 Stat. 1250
(1938) (repealed 1968), which provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence
or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a
firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such
firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received . . . in violation of this
Act.
Id. The Supreme Court rejected the Government's contention that the statutory presumption
should be permitted to stand if it was found that it was comparatively more convenient for
the defendant to produce evidence relating to the presumed fact. Rather, it was thought that
this "comparative convenience" standard was merely a corollary to the "rational connection"
approach, under which the Court determined that such a presumption violated due process.
319 U.S. at 467, 468.
113 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1968).
" Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 416 (1970).
"s Although both Leary and Turner intimated the applicability of a reasonable-doubt stan-
dard, in both cases the holding could be grounded upon the less demanding "more likely than
not" standard. See Constitutional Limitations, supra note 3, at 1031-33.
" See Constitutional Limitations, supra note 3, at 1034-37, wherein the author argues:
[Wihen a conclusive presumption is operative, the state should have to prove there
is no reasonable doubt that the presumed element in truth exists in every case. Where
only 0.5 percent of robberies result in murder, is it beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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logical to require that the presumption of mens rea flowing from proof of a
felony meet a degree of persuasion similar to that required of the element
of mens rea in an ordinary murder prosecution-proof of the element be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Under such an approach, it is doubtful that a
sufficient correlation could be demonstrated between the commission of a
felony and the intent to kill so as to justify the conclusive presumption of
the latter from proof of the former."'
Unfortunately, the argument in support of the constitutional invalid-
ity of this statutory presumption has not been accepted in the courts. Some
states avoid the question by characterizing their felony-murder statutes
not as conclusive presumptions of mens rea but as a legislative substitution
of proof of the felony for intent to kill as an element of the crime of
murder."7 The problem can also be avoided by distinguishing the cases in
which the constitutional limitations relating to criminal statutory pre-
sumptions have been developed from the felony-murder presumption, on
the ground that the decided cases deal only with malum prohibitum offen-
ses, and the limitations have not extended to crimes which are malum in
se.1"1 Long-standing judicial approval of the felony-murder presumption
indicates that the doctrine is constitutionally secure, barring a willingness
on the part of courts to reconsider the latitude afforded to legislatures to
define criminal conduct and prescribe its requisite elements." '
robber in every case intended to kill?
Id. at 1037. See also M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CaumiNAL HoMIcmE 240-44 (1958), cited in
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
" See, e.g., Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958
(1974); State v. Millette, 299 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1972). Such conclusions raise another interest-
ing constitutional question in that the utter abolition of mens rea as an element of murder
arguably may be regarded as violative of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has not, however, articulated any constitu-
tional doctrine of mens rea. For an argument in support of such a doctrine, see Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 3, at 1037-40.
'11 See, e.g., Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958
(1974).
"I See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 844 (1973). See also Mosby v. State, 253 Ark.
904, 907, 489 S.W.2d 799, 801 (1973) (felony-murder doctrine "has been part of our law since
1838 and we have no intention of overruling it").
The tension between due process concerns and the legislature's power to prescribe the
requisite elements of crime has affected recent developments relating to the constitutionality
of affirmative defenses to crimes. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court
first held that in a criminal prosecution, proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt is constitutionally mandated. The Court subsequently determined, in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), that the due process clause further requires that, under Maine
law, when a defendant attempts to reduce the crime of felonious homicide from murder to
manslaughter by raising the mitigating issue of heat of passion on sudden provocation, the
prosecution must assume the burden of proof in regard to this issue under the reasonable-
doubt standard. Applying the Winship rationale, a unanimous Court reviewed the history of
the heat of passion defense-which negates malice aforethought-and stated that
the fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation-has been, almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the
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single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an
unlawful homicide. And. . . the clear trend has been toward requiring the prosecution
to bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact.
Id. at 696. The prosecution was thus required to bear the burden of negating the "heat of
passion" assertion.
It was generally believed that the Mullaney holding sounded the death knell for statutory
schemes, such as New York's, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a), (2) (McKinney 1975), which
require a criminal defendant in a murder prosecution to bear the burden of proving the
mitigating factor of extreme emotional disturbance. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 49 App. Div.
2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (4th Dep't 1975); People v. Woods, 84 Misc. 2d 301, 375 N.Y.S.2d
750 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975); People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975). See also Note, The Constitutionality of New York's Affirma-
tive Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 51 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 158 (1976). The
Supreme Court, however, upheld the New York statutory scheme in Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
The Patterson Court regarded as relevant the fact that the affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance "is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of
heat of passion on sudden provocation," id. at 202, and proceeded to demonstrate that the
due process clause would not entirely overwhelm legislative discretion in the formulation of
substantive criminal law:
[Ilt [does] not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an
exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the sever-
ity of the punishment. Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a substantially expanded ver-
sion of the older heat-of-passion concept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts
making out the defense were established by the defendant with sufficient certainty.
The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence of those facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult. . . .The
Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of abandoning
those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime
which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punish-
ment.
Id. at 207-08.
Although the majority was satisfied that New York had fulfilled the Winship mandate
that it "prove beyond a reasonable doubt 'every fact necessary to constitute the crime...
charged,'" id. at 206 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)), the dissent contended
that the extreme emotional disturbance formulation is nothing more nor less than "the
modern equivalent of 'heat of passion.'" Id. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting). Concluding,
therefore, that Mullaney was dispositive, Justice Powell felt the view propounded by the
majority served only "to run a constitutional boundary line through the barely visible space
that separates Maine's law from New York's." Id. at 221. By limiting the Mullaney holding
to require the prosecution to prove the elements in the definition of the offense-a limitation
not apparent on the face of Mullaney, see 421 U.S. at 699 n.24 (Winship not limited to state's
definition of elements of a crime),-Justice Powell feared that the Court would permit "a
legislature to shift, virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a
criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in the
statutory language that defines the crime." 432 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The majority's response to such criticism was that a narrow viewing of the Mullaney
decision was appropriate:
There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps construing
the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
any fact affecting "the degree of criminal culpability".... It is said that such a rule
would deprive legislatures of any discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden of
proof, the practical effect of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our
FELONY-MURDER
An Unjust Procedural Advantage Is Obtained by the Prosecution Under
the Felony-Murder Rule
In those cases in which the felony-murder doctrine does not provide
the sole ground for a murder conviction-i. e., where the requisite mens rea
can be otherwise established-it continues to be a useful tool for prosecu-
tors endeavoring to establish murder. Significant procedural advantages
can be gained by predicating an indictment on felony-murder rather than,
or in the alternative with, intentional murder. Elimination of the need to
prove intent precludes the defendant from raising any defenses relating to
mental state. If felony-murder is the only basis for the prosecution's case,
i.e., no attempt is made alternatively to prove intentional murder, the
defendant's evidence of justification, excuse, or diminished capacity will
not be placed before the jury. Moreover, even if intentional murder and
felony-murder are charged in the alternative, the jury will be instructed
to disregard any evidence relating to these defenses in considering the
felony-murder charge.
Another procedural advantage'2 0 to be gained by the prosecution re-
lates to proof of the underlying felony. Since the felony-murder rule re-
lieves the prosecution of the burden of proving intent to kill upon a showing
that death occurred in the course of the commission of a felony, it would
appear logical that the prosecution should have to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the underlying felony-the substitute for the ele-
ment of intent-was committed. This is not the case in all instances. In
many jurisdictions the prosecution must present some evidence that the
underlying felony was committed, but that evidence may be in the form
of an uncorroborated confession. Since corroboration of a confession is only
required to establish that the crime charged has been committed, a confes-
sion of felony-murder will be sufficient to sustain conviction, without addi-
tional proof that the underlying felony was committed, so long as there is
corroboration of the homicide. 2' This was thought to be due to the fact that
criminal justice system. .... Carried to its logical extreme, such a reading of Mullaney
might also, for example, discourage Congress from enacting pending legislation to
change the felony-murder rule by permitting the accused to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the affirmative defense that the homicide committed was neither a
necessary nor a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony. . . .The
Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-reaching effect.
Id. at 214 n.15. See also S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977), reprinted in Reform of the
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9583 (1977), which would
provide: "It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution [for felony-murder] that the death
was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of: (1) the underlying offense; or (2) the particu-
lar circumstances under which it was committed."
'2 See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. Rv.
50 (1956), wherein the author proclaims that the felony-murder rule should not be applied
until lack of justification or excuse is established. Id. at 60.
12 See, e.g., People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973); People
v. Doherty, 28 Ill. 2d 528, 193 N.E.2d 37 (1963); People v. Crandell, 270 Mich. 124, 258 N.W.
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jurisdictions ordinarily do not require an indictment to state whether it is
based on intentional murder or felony-murder, that is, the crime charged
is simply murder.'
In New York, however, the form of indictment was recently revised to
require allegation of each offense charged in a separate count, and a state-
ment of every element of each crime charged.' 23 Since this form of indict-
ment appears to remove the logical underpinnings from the common law
approach, 2 it may now be argued that proof of each element of a felony-
murder charge, as stated in the indictment, must now be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt in New York.1 25 There has, however, been no clear adop-
tion of this interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals, although an
opportunity for consideration of the issue was presented in People v.
Murray.' M In Murray, a defendant confessed to attempted robbery and a
homicide resulting therefrom. He later disclaimed his confession of the
robbery, insisting that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense. The
robbery count was dismissed at the trial level because of insufficient evi-
dence to corroborate the confession of that crime. '2 Ironically, the defen-
dant's conviction for felony-murder was upheld by the court of appeals in
a 4-3 decision, despite the absence of evidence legally sufficient to convict
the defendant of the underlying felony.' 28
224 (1935); People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931).
"2 For instance, the New York Court of Appeals observed that "Itihe rule is settled that
there is no need to charge in an indictment that the homicide was wrought in the commission
of another felony. It suffices to state in the common-law form [of indictment] that the
defendant acted 'willfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought.' "People v. Lytton, 257
N.Y. 310, 315, 178 N.E. 290, 292 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (quoting People v. Giblin, 115 N.Y.
196, 198, 21 N.E. 1062, 1063 (1889)). The commission of the felony thus constituted only the
element of mens rea, and did not require independent corroboration. Rather, the defendant
had been charged only with the crime of homicide, and "the fact that a homicide has been
committed is proved, without reference to a confession by the testimony of eyewitnesses as
well as by the discovery of the body, bearing tokens of a fatal wound." Id. at 313-14, 178 N.E.
at 291.
"21 N.Y. CRIn. PRoc. LAW § 200.50 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) (effective 1971).
,2, See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
In Id.
-21 40 N.Y.2d 327, 353 N.E.2d 605, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1976).
127 Id. at 330-31, 353 N.E.2d at 607-08, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 694.
'2 The three-judge plurality in Murray construed N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.50 (McKinney
1971), which states "A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a
confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has
been committed." The plurality determined that the confession corroboration statute was
intended to require proof of the corpus delicti and thus necessitated no more than proof that
a loss (i.e., homicide) occurred and that it was the result of human agency. 40 N.Y.2d at 331,
353 N.E.2d at 608, 386 N.Y.S.2d 694. Judge Gabrielli noted that "[it suffices to show
corroborating circumstances 'which, when considered in connection with the confession are
sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 332, 353 N.E.2d at 608-09, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (quoting People v. Conroy,
287 N.Y. 201, 202, 38 N.E.2d 499, 499 (1941)). The judge thus concluded that there was
sufficient proof of homicide to support a murder conviction, despite the lack of any evidence,
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Legislative reassessment and clarification are called for if the court
chooses to impose felony-murder liability on defendants against whom
there is legally insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of the underly-
ing felony.' 9 If the element of mens rea is to be replaced by a showing that
death occurred in the course of a felony, it is submitted that the commis-
sion of the felony should be subject to a standard of proof similar to that
required for the element thus replaced.
EFFECT OF ABOLrrION OF THE FELONY-MURDER RULE
The experience in England following abolition of the felony-murder
rule suggests that its demise would have little effect on the rate of convic-
tion for killings occurring in the course of felonies.' The drafters of the
Model Penal Code have stated that if any change in the rate of conviction
were to appear, there would be comfort in the knowledge that the convic-
tions obtained were "based on solid grounds." 3 '
other than an uncorroborated confession, that a robbery-the predicate felony-had been
committed.
Judge Jasen, in dissent, argued that a conviction for felony-murder is unsupportable
when the evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction for the underlying predicate
felony. The judge emphasized that New York's recently revised form of indictment, N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.50 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) (effective 1971), which requires the
allegation of murder and felony-murder in separate counts, as well as the allegation of a
predicate felony in a felony-murder indictment, had effectively overruled People v. Lytton,
257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931) (Cardozo, J.) (dictum) (since indictment need not allege
that homicide was committed in course of another felony, there is no need for independent
corroboration of the underlying felony). Under the present statute, Judge Jasen argued, the
prosecution had not met its burden of proving every element of the alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, since the evidence was legally insufficient to convict the defendant of the
felony underlying the homicide:
Although corroboration need not extend to every element of the crime, each element
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is no proof of an intent to
kill and no corroboration of an admission that a predicate felony occurred, the element
of mens rea has not been established to the extent required by law. Here, there has
been no proof of intent and, likewise, no legally sufficient proof of the predicate felony
of attempted robbery. Hence, there has been no sufficient proof of defendant's guilt of
intentional murder, or of felony murder. It is fundamentally unfair, if not shocking to
the concerned conscience, that, as our three colleagues maintain, an unproved felony
may be employed to artificially raise the defendant's culpable mental state. Surely, it
is wrong to read the felony out of felony murder. . . . We would hold that a man-
slaughterer cannot be punished as a murderer because of the unsupported use of a legal
fiction.
40 N.Y.2d at 344, 353 N.E.2d at 616-17, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Judge Wachtler, who cast the deciding vote, apparently agreed with the dissent that
corroboration of the underlying felony itself is necessary for a felony-murder conviction-but
found that the robbery had been sufficiently corroborated to support the conviction. Id. at
335, 353 N.E.2d at 611, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
,l See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.50, commentary at 145 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
,3 Convictions for felony-murder can ordinarily rest on other grounds. See Comment, Felony-
Murder in Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L. REv. 685, 693.
'"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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In jurisdictions which adopt the common law definitions of murder,
either by implication or by statutory codification, abolition of the rule
would have little effect in those cases where criminal liability also could
be based on malice implied from the reckless commission of an act
"creat[ing] a strong probability of death, or great bodily harm,"'32 from
acts committed "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme in-
difference to the value of human life,"'' 3  or from acts "evincing a depraved
mind regardless of human life."134 It is those cases for which no other basis
for criminal liability exists which result in harsh and unjustified applica-"
tion of the felony-murder rule.
Both felony-murder and its companion doctrine, misdemeanor-
manslaughter, operate either to create a conclusive presumption of mens
rea or to impose strict liability for homicide without regard to mens rea.'3
Only fifteen states specifically provide for application of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule, 36 while four more apply the common law rule. 37 The
majority of recent recodifications have followed the example of the Model
Penal Code by rejecting misdemeanor-manslaughter.'3 Ironically, the
number of jurisdictions which recognize the injustice of imposing strict
criminal liability for this lesser crime is significantly greater than those
holding a similar opinion of felony-murder.
The concept of basing the degree of punishment on the seriousness of
the result of the criminal act seems grossly misplaced in a legal system
which recognizes the degree of mental culpability as the appropriate stan-
dard for fixing criminal liability.3 9 The abolition of the felony-murder rule
3 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
"3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Prop. Official Draft 1962). See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1503(1)(b) (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(2) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(a)
(1975).
11 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(1) (West Supp. 1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1(4) (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.8(1) (West 1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.115 (1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-7 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-5-203(1)(c) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (1977); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.02 (West 1958).
35 See notes 108-19 and accompanying text supra.
Im ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 320 (1959); IDAHO CODE § 18-4006(a), (c) (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-1-4 (Bums Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.10 (West 1950); KA. STAT. § 21-3401
(1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31(2)(a) (West 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-27 (1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-305 (1977); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.040 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-3(B)
(1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(B) (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 711(1)
(West 1958); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-15(1) (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
2409 (1975); Wyo: STAT. § 6-58 (1959).
"I See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1976); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321 (1968); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-23-3 (1970); S.C. CODE § 16-3-50 (1976).
' W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 275 (1978).
'3' See, e.g., Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F.
565, 586-87 (1966), wherein the author observes:
It is indeed hard to state a justification for the constructive mens rea of felony murder
in terms of accepted notions of the purpose and efficacy of penal sanctions and individ-
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would have the effect of replacing retribution with blameworthiness as a
guide to imposition of punishment.
While it seems clear that application of the felony-murder rule is
unjustified except in those instances where criminal liability has an inde-
pendent basis, legislatures are understandably reluctant to abolish the rule
altogether."" Such a move may appear to legislators' constituents to indi-
cate a soft position on crime. In view of public sentiment favoring a "law
and order" approach, outspoken advocacy of abolition of the rule could be
tantamount to political suicide. It would appear that efforts to educate the
public regarding the shortcomings of the doctrine must precede any cam-
paign of abolition.
Nonetheless, some guidelines may be suggested in order to make the
operation of the doctrine more palatable. It has been demonstrated that
the most telling criticisms of the doctrine fall into four categories: (1) its
retributive purpose does not accord with our current notions of punishment
based upon culpability; (2) its use to establish vicarious liability similarly
does violence to our concept of culpability; (3) its presumption of a mens
rea for murder may offend constitutional notions of due process; and (4)
its use affords unjust procedural advantages to the prosecution. All of these
criticisms are answerable, at least to some extent, by the various limita-
tions which have been put into effect by many of the jurisdictions. For
example, restriction of application of the rule solely to inherently danger-
ous felonies' does much to rationalize the imposition of a murder convic-
tion upon perpetrators of such crimes who kill their victims, for this height-
ens the felon's culpability for the results of his actions. Likewise, the vicari-
ous liability which seems so misplaced can be limited by invocation of an
affirmative defense"' and by redefinition of felony-murder to extend only
as far as killings done "in furtherance of" the felony.' The due process
question raised by the "conclusive presumption" approach to felony-
murder can be obviated by adoption of the Model Penal Code's rebuttable
presumption of a mens rea for murder which attaches after proof of the
felony,'" or by other formulations which require proof of a mens rea to
establish felony-murder."' Use of the merger doctrine"' can avoid at least
ual fairness. If one had to choose the most basic principle of the criminal law in general
and the new Penal Law in particular it would be that criminal liability for causing a
particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect
to that result. ...
The felony murder rule violates this principle by dispensing with any culpable
mental state in relation to the death caused thereby, contenting itself with whatever
mens rea existed respecting the collateral felony.
"o See, e.g., Denzer, supra note 4, at 260.
" See notes 12-37 and accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 87-91 and accompanying text supra.
43 See notes 72-86 and accompanying text supra.
', See notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 45-46, 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
14 See notes 58-70 and accompanying text supra.
162 23 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1978
some of the most unfair of the procedural advantages awarded to the
prosecution when it proceeds on felony-murder grounds. Finally, those
states which treat homicide committed in the course of a felony as some-
thing less than felony-murder"' have, in effect, abolished felony-murder.
All of these ameliorative devices have the beneficial effect of making appli-
cation of the felony-murder doctrine both more humane and more rational.
It should be noted, however, that the rule remains essentially inhu-
mane and irrational, for the limiting devices do not entirely correct its
flaws and inequities. The potential for-and reality of-injustice will con-
tinue to exist so long as vestiges of the rule remain operative. It is therefore
submitted that, although the viability of the felony-murder doctrine may
be enhanced by the imposition of such limitations, the jurisdictions should
strive for total abolition of the rule at the earliest practicable opportunity.
" See notes 38-44 and accompanying text supra.
